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Almost a decade of overt war in Indochina;
military interventions in Greece, Iran, Lebanon,
the Congo, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Colum-
bia, Guatemala, Panama, Bolivia, China, Korea
and Thailand; military missions throughout most
of the &dquo;free world&dquo;; and American economic
dominance of countless Third World countries
have combined to impress upon all but the most
recalcitrant observer the truth in the assertion that
in the postwar period the United States has been a
formidable imperialist power. Indeed, a brief
review of American history points to a pattern of
imperialist behavior that goes back long before the
postwar period to the very beginning of the Federal
republic.[l] That the United States is now and has
long been an imperialist power is a proposition that
is no longer subject to serious debate. Very much a
matter of dispute, however, are the sources of
American imperialism.
A great variety of alternative theories of
imperialism have been advanced to explain the
American experience, and these theories have given
rise to sharp controversies over the years. Since the
escalation of the war in Vietnam and the
resurgence of a radical movement in the United
States during the past decade, proponents of
&dquo;radical&dquo; theories of American imperialism have
challenged with increasing intensity the prevailing
orthodoxy on the subject.[2] &dquo;Orthodox&dquo; theorists
have in turn responded to the challenge with
counter-attacks on the radical theorists.[3] The
purpose of this essay is to examine these
contending schools of thought with a view to
determining their relative merit in analyzing the
sources of contemporary American imperialism.
Given the variety of views and the differences
of emphasis among theorists of each school, it is no
easy matter to draw the line that separates radical
from orthodox theories of imperialism. Sometimes
it is suggested that the central distinctive feature of
a radical approach is the prominence attributed to
&dquo;economic&dquo; as opposed to other kinds of
motivations for imperialism.[4] At other times it is
contended that the key issue is whether or not the
United States &dquo;requires&dquo; imperialism in order in
some sense to survive.[5] While these may be
important and interesting issues in their own right,
they do not seem to me to go to the heart of the
theoretical distinction between radical and ortho-
dox approaches.
I believe that what fundamentally unites
radical theorists is an insistence on analyzing
societies as integrated social systems in concrete
historical circumstances. The radical approach
differs from the orthodox approach to the social
sciences in the Western world (1) by emphasizing
the interdependence of different spheres of a
society rather than compartmentalizing these
spheres and treating them independently, and (2)
by analyzing a society in terms of its specific insti-
tutional structure rather than in terms of abstract
universal propositions.[6] This distinction points to
a criterion for distinguishing radical and orthodox
theories of American imperialism which hinges on
the significance attached to the particular form of
socioeconomic organization that characterizes the
United States.
The prevailing orthodox view attributes
American imperialism primarily to the existence of
a system of geographically distinct societies claim-
ing independent political sovereignty. Orthodox
theorists hold that the internal socioeconomic
organization of a society has relatively little to do
with the propensity for imperialist behavior.
Rather, it is the externally imposed competition
among sovereign states that generates imperialism
in general and American imperialism in particu-
lar.[3]
Against this orthodoxy there is arrayed a
variety of revisionist radical theories, inspired
largely by the Marxist tradition.[8] The unifying
distinctive feature of the radical theories is the
assertion that American imperialism results to a
significant extent from the fact that the United
States is a capitalist society. Thus radical theorists
argue that the internal socioeconomic organization
of a society does make a great deal of difference,
and that American imperialism cannot be
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adequately explained without reference to Ameri-
can capitalism.[9]
In this essay I propose to evaluate the contend-
ing theories by considering whether or not it is
reasonable to locate sources of American imperial-
ism in certain specifically capitalist insitutions. In
so doing, I will consider a variety of possible causal
links between capitalism and imperialism that have
been hypothesized by radical theorists and I will
suggest a few new ones as well.
I begin in section II by defining clearly what I
mean by the term &dquo;imperialism&dquo; and by listing as
comprehensively as possible various potential
sources of imperialism. In Section III I attempt to
determine which sources can plausibly be regarded
as contributing to American imperialist activity in
the postwar period. In section IV I first define the
term &dquo;capitalism&dquo; and then go on to consider
whether each plausible source of American
imperialism is independent of internal socioeco-
nomic organization or is rooted in specific
capitalist institutions. Finally I conclude in section
V that the radical view of American imperialism is
indeed a valid one, and I proceed to examine some
of the implictions of that conclusion for anti-imper-
ialist movements.
II. Alternative Sources of Imperialism
The word &dquo;imperialism&dquo; is notoriously im-
precise. So many writers have used it in so many
different ways and for so many different purposes
that it is incumbent upon anyone intending to dis-
cuss the subject to define quite clearly what is to be
understood by the term.[10]
Among a host of alternative definitions one
can usefully distinguish at the outset between
Marxist and non-Marxist definitions. For Marxists
imperialism represents a stage of capitalism
associated with the growth of monopolistic firms
in the industrialized capitalist nations and the
spread of the capitalist mode of production across
national borders into previously non-capitalist
areas.[11] Marxists may differ as to the precise
characteristics of the imperialist stage of capital-
ism, but there is a general consensus that imperial-
ism is a term that describes capitalism in a
particular phase of its development. Under such a
definition, the relationship between imperialism
and capitalism is purely tautological: where there is
imperialism, there must by definition also be
capitalism. One can dispute and investigate the
consequences of imperialism, but the sources of
imperialism are necessarily found in the capitalist
mode of production.
For the purposes of this essay, a Marxist
definition of imperialism is inappropriate. I seek to
investigate certain patterns of behavior associated
with the notion of &dquo;American imperialism&dquo; and to
determine the extent to which these patterns of
behavior result from the capitalist form of socio-
economic organization that characterizes the
United States. For this to be a meaningful inquiry,
imperialism must be defined in terms that are
independent of any particular form of socioeco-
nomic organization.
Non-Marxist definitions of imperialism gen-
erally refer to a relationship of domination/subor-
dination between two communities, where a
community is characterized as a social collectivity
with a strong sense of one-ness.[12] The agent of
domination may be public and/or private organiza-
tions in the dominant community; the sphere of
domination may be military, political, economic, or
cultural; and the communities may represent
nations or ethnic groups within nations. However
delimited, a non-Marxist definition of imperialism
suggests the use of superior power or authority by
one community of people to exercise control over
another.
In this essay I will use the term imperialism in
a non-Marxist sense according to the following
definition: imperialism is activity on the part of a
national government which involves the use of
power (or the threat of its use) to establish or main-
tain a relationship of domination or control over
the government or (some of) the people of another
nation or territory over which the imperialist
government has no traditional claim to sovereignty.
This definition deliberately focuses attention on the
activity of government agencies rather than private
organizations, thereby ignoring an important but
separable component of American imperialism.[13]
Among the imperialist activities of government
agencies it includes not only the most obvious
instances of territorial annexation and military
occupation, but also any use of military, economic
or diplomatic power to establish, maintain or
expand spheres of control over foreigners. In short,
imperialism is defined here essentially as an expan-
sionary foreign policy.[14]
Some theorists of imperialism are content to
rest with the general argument advanced by Landes
that &dquo;one has to look at imperialism as a multi-
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farious response to a common opportunity that
consists simply in a disparity of power. Whenever
and wherever such disparity has existed, people
and groups have been ready to take advantage of
it.&dquo;[15] Such a view appears readily confirmed by
the fact that imperialist activity is now, and has
always been, carried out by relatively powerful
states. Obviously the opportunity to carry out
imperialist activity depends on the disparity of
power between the potential actor and the potential
victim.
But imperialist activity requires more than the
opportunity consisting in a disparity of power; it
requires also a motivation for a government to take
advantage of that opportunity. If a government
applies its superior power in an imperialist activity
-- indeed, if a government chooses in the first place
to develop the kind of power that can be deployed
in an imperialist manner - then there must be
some identifiable motivation for its behavior. No
theory of imperialism is complete without an
explanation for this motivation.
Every imperialist activity involves some
expenditure of energy and resources by the
imperialist government. The expenditure may be
trivial - as in the case of diplomatic pressure - or
it may be very substantial, as in the case of military
intervention. If such expenditure is undertaken by
a government, it must be done with the expectation
that some kind of benefits will result from it.
Accordingly, one can distinguish alternative
motivations from imperialism according to the
alternative kinds of interests which might be
promoted by imperialist activity.
In analyzing alternative interests in imperial-
ism I will distinguish carefully between a &dquo;national
interest&dquo; and a &dquo;class interest.&dquo; I will say that there
is a national interest in an imperialist activity when
the activity is expected to benefit the imperialist
nation as a whole, in the sense that the aggregate
benefits to citizens of the imperialist nation are
expected to exceed the aggregate costs. I will say
that there is a class interest in an imperialist
activity when it is expected to result in net benefits
for a particular class of people from among the
citizens of the imperialist nation. If there is a
national interest in an imperialist activity there is
bound to be also at least one class interest,
although there may be other classes for whom the
anticipated net benefits are negative. On the other
hand, if there is a class interest in an imperialist
activity, there may or may not also be a national
interest.
If one can identify a national interest in an
imperialist activity, there is a prima facie
motivation for the government to undertake it. The
government will refrain from the imperialist
activity only if (1) there is some cla:.s which stands
to lose by the activity, and (2) that class has dispro-
portionate power to prevent the government from
undertaking the activity even though other classes
stand to gain more than the particular class expects
to lose by it. If one can find no national interest in a
potential imperialist activity, there may nonetheless
be a motivation for the government to undertake it
if (1) there is a class interest in the activity and (2)
the interested class has the disproportionate power
to induce the government to undertake the activity
even though other classes stand to lose more than
the particular class expects to gain by it.
In the remainder of this section I will attempt
to review as comprehensively as possible the major
kinds of motivations for imperialism which have
been suggested explicitly or implicitly by both
radical and orthodox theorists. I will first consider
motivations based on an identifiable national
interest and the assumption that there is no losing
class strong enough to prevent the imperialist
activity; these will be labeled &dquo;national motiva-
tions.&dquo; I will then consider motivations based on a
particular class interest and the assumption that
the class is powerful enough to have the imperialist
activity undertaken; these will be labeled &dquo;class-
based motivations.&dquo;
A major national motivation for imperialism
that is always cited and most strongly emphasized
by orthodox theorists is to enhance national
security.[16] It is argued that every nation has a
collective interest in defending its territory against
possible attack by other nations that may be or may
become hostile and aggressive. Nations that are
sufficiently powerful to engage in imperialist
activity will find that efforts to control other
nations can contribute significantly to national
security by improving the military posture of the
imperialist nation vis-a-vis its actual or potential
enemies.
A second possible national motivation for
imperialism is one that is suggested in the work of
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many radical theorists: to maintain macroeconom-
ic prosperity, i.e., to avoid economic crises that
threaten the viability of the whole economy.[17] A
variety of different arguments have been advanced
to explain how the pursuit of an imperialist foreign
policy can help to maintain the prosperity of an
economy. The arguments are usually presented in
the context of capitalist economies, although some
of them may conceivably apply to non-capitalist
economies as well. In the following paragraphs I
shall discuss alternative lines of reasoning that have
been developed to link imperialism with macro-
economic prosperity.
The first line of reasoning is derived from the
classical theory of underconsumption and associ-
ated with the work of Hobson, Luxemburg, and -
apparently erroneously - Lenin.[18] Although
various writers have expressed it in different ways,
the basic argument can be summarized in a
consistent and logically valid form as follows: (1)
there is a chronic tendency in a capitalist economy
for aggregate demand to be insufficient to absorb
all of the output that is produced; (2) there is
consequently a continual need to find new outlets
for surplus production in order to avoid an
economic crisis; (3) foreign countries and territories
represent important potential markets for the
domestic surplus; and (4) an imperialist foreign
policy provides access to these markets for the
imperialist country.
Hobson regarded the problem of undercon-
sumpiton/overproduction as potentially solvable
through a redistribution of income, while
Luxemburg argued that the problem was inherent
in the structure of capitalism. Hobson emphasized
the notion of &dquo;surplus capital&dquo; seeking outlets
abroad and the need for capital exports, while
Luxemburg stressed overproduction and commod-
ity exports. But the underlying logic of the
argument is the same in each case: surplus capital
or overproduction at home can be alleviated by net
capital exports, i.e., by selling more goods abroad
than are purchased abroad for home consumption.
A variant of this line of reasoning can be
formulated by extending the work of modern
Marxists on the problem of surplus absorption in a
capitalist economy.[19] This variant begins with the
same premise of underconsumption or insufficient
aggregate demand. However the solution to the
problem is attributed not to net capital exports but
to military expenditures. In this case a motivation
for imperialism arises from the need to legitimize
such expenditures: an interventionist foreign policy
creates a climate in which it is easy to justify the
maintenance of a large military establishment and
high levels of military spending.
Apart from arguments linking imperialist to
macroeconomic prosperity via the need to maintain
a high level of aggregate demand, there is an
alternative line of reasoning which focuses directly
on a need to maintain access to foreign economies.
’ Arguments along this line have been advanced by
many radical theorists examining contemporary
American imperialism[20], and they are clearly
inspired by some aspects fo the work of early
Marxist theorists of imperialism such as Hilfer-
ding,Luxemburg and Lenin.[21]
One such argument emphasizes a need for
opportunities to undertake direct capital invest-
ment in foreign countries or territories. It is argued
that there tends to be an inadequate supply of
profitable investment opportunities at home, and
that access to more profitable investment
opportunities abroad is necessary to maintain
overall economic prosperity. Imperialism is
motivated by the desire to assure adequate
opportunities for such foreign investment.
A second argument focuses on a need for
opportunities to export domestically produced
commodities to foreign markets. It is argued that
exports contribute significantly to economic pros-
perity - e.g., by strengthening the balance of
payments - and that imperialism helps to provide
the access to foreign markets needed to keep up the
flow of exports.
A final argument stresses the importance of
imported raw materials for an industrialized
economy. This argument begins with the observa-
tion that there are a variety of key industrial raw
materials whose domestic supply is inadequate to
meet the input requirements of the economy. It is
then contended that the economy would be severely
crippled without access to foreign supplies of these
materials, and that an imperialist foreign policy
can play an important role in maintaining that
access.
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The desire to maintain macroeconomic
prosperity and to avoid major crises is not the only
possible national economic motivation for imper-
ialism. Most writers would agree that imperialism
may be motivated on national economic grounds
simply in order to increase the aggregate economic
gains accruing to the imperialist nation from its
economic relations with other nations. The
conditions under which private or public enter-
prises in one nation enter into trade or investment
activities with or in other nations are obviously
susceptible to the exercise of power. To the extent
that one nation can exercise some degree of control
over another, there are a variety of ways in which it
can secure greater economic gains for its nationals
than would be possible under a relationship of
equality. The imperialist nation can use its power
to improve the terms of trade and thereby lower the
effective price of various imported commodities; it
can enlarge export markets and increase the
country’s export earnings; it can enlarge export
earnings; it can secure more favorable conditions
for its investors and thereby increase their
repatriated profits; and in general it can open up
new trade and investment opportunities in areas
which for whatever reasons might otherwise not be
receptive to economic intercourse. In all such cases
there are of course particular classes of people who
have the most to gain from imperialism, and there
are others who may have something to lose. But
there is always a potential national interest - in
addition to a class interest - so long as the overall
benefits realized by citizens of the imperialist
nation exceed the associated costs.
A fourth kind of national motivation for
imperialism that has been suggested by some
writers is based on a generalized missionary
spirit.[16] It is argued that the people of a nation
can be so imbued with a belief in the desirability of
their own institutions and values that they feel
morally justified - indeed morally obliged - to
extend their system to other parts of the world, even
where this requires the use of power to impose the
system on recalcitrant foreigners. The gains arising
from imperialism of this kind are neither military-
strategic nor economic; they are psychic gains
involving a sense of satisfaction derived from
promoting (what is perceived to be) a better world.
A final national motivation for imperialism
resembles the missionary spirit in that it involves
psychic rather than military-strategic or economic
gains: this arises simply from a generalized urge to
dominate. Proponents of this view often contend
that there is inherent in human nature an aggres-
sive instinct that applies both on an individual and
a group or national level.[231 People derive
satisfaction from domination, from being &dquo;number
one.&dquo; Hence nations that can develop and apply the
power to dominate other nations will be inclined to
do so if only to satisfy the atavistic urge among
their people to achieve a position of supremacy over
others. Whether or not one considers the urge to
dominate a natural human instinct, one can argue
that in certain historical periods it has helped to
motivate imperialist activity.
Among possible class-based motivations for
imperialism one can identify first a motivation
based on the the interest of the dominant classes of
any unequal society in promoting their own social
legitimacy.[24] There are several ways in which
imperialist actions might serve to legitimate the
dominance of some classes over others within a
nation. By generating or accentuating antagonisms
between the nation and other nations on an
international level, imperialism can deflect atten-
tion and concern away from internal conflicts
between dominant and subordinate classes and
rally all people behind the leadership of the
dominant classes. By maintaining or extending the
geographical spread of institutions and values
characteristic of the imperialist nation, and by
limiting the spread of alternative institutions and
values, imperialism can discourage the notion that
there are any real alternatives to the existing system
with its particular class relations. For such reasons
a national &dquo;missionary spirit,&dquo; and indeed exces-
sive concern over &dquo;national security,&dquo; may actually
result from the efforts of dominant classes to
promote their own social legitimacy on an ideologi-
cal plane.
A second possible class-based motivation for
imperialism may arise from the interest of civilian
or military government bureaucracies in organiza-
tional expansioh. [25] Members of virtually any
organization have something to gain from an
expansion in the volume of activity for which the
organization is responsible: it leads to more
promotions, more prestige, more power, if not more
pay. This general phenomenon is no less true of the
civilian and military agencies of government that
are directly involved in imperialist activity. Such
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agencies will have a natural inclination to favor the
expansion of imperialism wherever it is at issue.
One last major class-based motivation for
imperialism, most frequently stressed by radical
writers, arises from opportunities for particular
firms, agencies or classes to increase their
particular economic gains from international
economic relations. Such opportunities are as
varied as the opportunities cited earlier for increas-
ing the aggregate economic gains from internation-
al economic relations, the only difference being
that in this case there may be losses to other groups
within the society which outweigh the gains from
imperialism. Improving terms of trade, widening
export markets, providing privileged access to raw
materials, securing better conditions for investors,
opening up new areas for trade and investment -
any and all of these can lead to economic gains for
particular firms, agencies or classes. They will
therefore be motivated to press for imperialist acts
to achieve such results, whether or not the net
benefits to the nation as a whole are positive.
HI. Motivations for American Imperialism
The pattern of American imperialism in the
postwar period is susceptible to a variety of inter-
pretations. Each act of imperialism is consistent
with several different explanations based on some
of the different motivations for imperialism listed
in the previous section. Hence it is impossible to
isolate one particular source of imperialism as the
only or even the major explanatory factor. It is most
likely in any event that several different factors
have contributed to American imperialism, and the
most one can expect to do in examining competing
explanations is to determine which are plausible
and which are not. In this section I propose to
examine each motivation for imperialism cited
earlier to evaluate its plausibility in the context of
the contemporary United States.
To demonstrate the plausibility of a motiva-
tion for imperialism one must first identify an
interest in imperialism and then show that the
structure of power is such that the interest in
imperialism will be reflected in government policy.
In the case of a national interest one need only
show that there is no class opposed to imperialist
activity which has sufficient power to prevent it. In
the case of a class interest one must show that the
interested class has sufficient power to promote
imperialist activity. In the following paragraphs I
will first consider whether or not there have been
interest in American imperialism corresponding to
each of the motivations discussed in Section II. I
will then turn to an examination of the distribution
of power to affect government decision-making
about imperialist activity.
Explanations for American imperialism based
on a national security interest have a ring of
plausibility. American political leaders have not
hesitated in the postwar period to brand the Soviet
Union or China as an aggressive hostile power and
to justify military interventions and military bases
around the world as necessary to protect the United
States against enemy attack. Yet it is difficult to see
how any rational calculus based on national
security considerations could explain many in-
stances of American intervention that have taken
place in small and/or distant countries such as
Vietnam, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala,
etc., which pose no visible threat to American
security no matter with whom they might be allied.
Nor is it plausible that national security considera-
tions could require American economic dominance
of many countries in the world with little economic
or military potential. Of course, an irrational cal-
culus might give rise to exaggerated notions of what
is required for American national security, but to
appeal to irrationality to explain such a persistent
pattern of behavior is to place much too heavy a
burden on a thin reed. Granted that a national
security interest probably plays some role in
motivating American imperialism, it cannot by any
stretch of the imagination be regarded as the
primary tap-root.[26]
The possibility that American imperialism has
been motivated by a national interest in promoting
macroeconomic prosperity is one which has given
rise to a great deal of controversy. Several orthodox
theorists[27] have undertaken detailed analyses
which purport to demonstrate that the American
economy is not structurally dependent upon imper-
ialism for its prosperity, i.e., that it could maintain
its prosperity without resorting to any imperialist
activity. This proposition may well be true. But
even if imperialist activity was not absolutely
necessary to maintain prosperity, it remains
perfectly possible that imperialist activity has been
-- and will continue to be - motivated by an
interest in promoting prosperity. One need only
show that imperialism can contribute to prosperity,
and that it is plausible to attribute some American
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imperialist activity to this motivation.
The first two variants of the macroeconomic
prosperity motivation for imperialism are based on
the presumed need to maintain a high level of
aggregate demand. There can be little question
that the maintenance of an adequate level of
aggregate demand has been an important
economic policy problem of the United States
government. Several postwar recessions attest to
the persistence and the difficulty of the problem. It
is also undeniable that increases in net exports
(exports minus imports) and/or military expendi-
tures contribute to higher levels of aggregate
demand. And one can envision circumstances in
which imperialist activity could promote both of
these sources of demand. Hence, these arguments
for a macroeconomic prosperity interest in
imperialism ae logically valid; the only question is
whether they are empirically plausible in the
context of the postwar United States.
A glance at the relevant macroeconomic
statistics casts great doubt on the significance of
net capital exports in maintaining aggregate
demand. Throughout the postwar period net
exports from the United States have rarely
exceeded 1% of the gross national product (GNP),
and in recent years they have actually become nega-
tive.[28] One might argue that in the absence of
imperialist activity the net export figures would
have been even lower, but the quantities involved
are so small in relation to total GNP that it is quite
implausible to suggest that American imperialism
has been motivated to any significant extent by a
national interest in promoting macroeconomic
prosperity through higher net exports.
The case that military expenditures have been
undertaken to bolster aggregate demand is much
stronger. The rate of military spending as a
proportion of GNP has varied between 7% and 13%
since 1950, and military spending has been by far
the largest single component of aggregate demand
under government control.[29] Moreover, there has
been an unmistakable correlation between periods
of relatively high military expenditures and periods
of relatively high levels of aggregate demand.[30]
Such observations are suggestive, although by no
means conclusive. Even granting a significant role
to military spending in maintaining aggregate
demand, one must still consider whether it is
plausible that imperialist activity has been
motivated by an interest in keeping up military
spending. Certainly many kinds of imperialist
activity - from the maintenance of military bases
abroad to actual military interventions abroad -
serve to increase the demand for military
expenditures. Morever, by antagonizing other
nations imperialist activities can increase the threat
of military action against the imperialist nation or
its nationals abroad and thereby indirectly
contribute to a greater demand for military expen-
ditures. But the fact that imperialism often results
in higher military expenditures does not prove that
it is undertaken even in part for that purpose.
There are many ways in which an increase in
military spending can be and has been justified by
the American government (e.g., in terms of
national security), and it seems rather implausible
to suggest that imperialist activity has been
intended to legitimize military spending.
The three remaining motivations for imperial-
ism based on a national interest in macroeconomic
prosperity focus on the need for foreign investment,
exports and imports, respectively. Two questions
must be addressed in an assessment of the
plausibility of such motivations in the postwar
United States: how important are foreign invest-
ment, exports and imports for the prosperity of the
American economy, and to what extent does
imperialism contribute to sustaining the flow of
foreign investment, exports and imports?
Turning first to foreign investment, there is no
doubt that the magnitude and rate of growth of
U.S. direct private investment abroad in the
postwar period has been formidable. The total
value of U.S. direct private foreign investment rose
from $11 billion in 1950 to $86 billion by 1971.[31]
As a proportion of the corresponding total value of
U.S. corporate assets at home and abroad, direct
private foreign assets represented approximately
5% in 1950 and 10% in 1971.[32] The relative
importance of after-tax profits from this foreign.
investment appears to have been even greater,
rising from less than 10% of total after-tax
corporate profits to approach 20% two decades
later.[33]
Should the United States economy suddenly
be deprived of access to these foreign investment
assets, it is likely that macroeconomic prosperity
would be threatened. At the very least there would
be a very difficult period of economic readjustment.
Yet it does not follow that U.S. imperialist activity
can plausibly be ascribed to an interest in assuring
sufficient investment opportunities abroad to
preserve macroeconomic prosperity. For many of
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these opportunities are available and will remain
available whether or not the United States
undertakes any imperialist activity. More than
two-thirds of the total investment assets and more
than one-half of the profits therefrom result from
investment undertaken in the &dquo;developed&dquo; capital-
ist countries[34] whose borders are generally open
to foreign investors without serious hindrance.[35]
Of the remaining U.S. assets and profits generated
in the &dquo;underdeveloped&dquo; countries, some might
well be dependent on the pursuit of an imperialist
policy while others would not. But it is difficult to
argue that the overall prosperity of the American
economy would be seriously affected by the loss of
investment opportunities that accounted for sub-
stantially less than 5% of total corporate assets and
substantially less than 10% of total after-tax
corporate profits. The United States economy -
and certain particular firms - would suffer some
economic losses, but there is every reason to believe
that the economy would remain buoyant with a
somewhat lower level of direct private investment
abroad.
The case of exports is similar to the case of
foreign investment: the magnitude of exports
dependent upon the pursuit of an imperialist
foreign policy appears too low to render plausible
the hypothesis that American imperialism has been
motivated to some extent by an interest in
maintaining macroeconomic prosperity through
export promotion. Throughout the postwar period
exports have constituted less than 5% of the total
GNP of the United States; moreover, approxi-
mately two-thirds of these exports have gone to the
&dquo;developed&dquo; capitalist countries whose markets
generally remain accessible with or without
American imperialism.[36] And even in the
&dquo;underdeveloped&dquo; countries the accessibility of
most markets to American exports does not seem
likely to depend upon imperialist activity. Once
again, the United States economy - and particular
exporting firms - would suffer some losses if
accessibility to certain export markets dependent
upon imperialism were denied. But it seems very
implausible that such losses could precipitate a
general economic crisis, and it is therefore
implausible that any imperialist activity has been
motivated by an interest in maintaining overall
prosperity through exports.
At first glance it might appear that a similar
case could be made for imports, whose total value
as a proportion of GNP in the United States is
virtually the same as that of exports. but imports
can have a significance far greater than their
nominal value if they consist of raw materials
required as imports into some production process.
For unless the flow of raw materials is maintained,
the production of an entire industry may have to be
cut back, and this in time can have significant
repercussions throughout an interdependent indus-
trialized economy.
The extent to which the American economy
has come to make use of imported raw materials
has been extensively documented in a variety of
sources.[37] Imports account for a large fraction of
the supply of key metals such as tin, nickel,
manganese, mica, platinum, titanium, chromium,
tungsten, and cobalt. Moreover, imports account
for an increasingly significant fraction of the supply
of such common minerals as iron ore, copper,
bauxite, lead and zinc. And the current &dquo;energy
crisis&dquo; has highlighted the growing extent to which
American oil supplies are likely to come from
abroad. The foreign sources of most of these raw
materials are located not in the &dquo;developed&dquo; capi-
talist countries, which are relatively accessible from
the point of view of the United States, but in the
&dquo;underdeveloped&dquo; countries to which access can be
unreliable.
Granted that the United States currently
imports significant quantities of key raw materials
from &dquo;underdeveloped&dquo; countries, it remains to be
determined whether imperialist activity may
plausibly be motivated by an interest in keeping up
the flow of such imports. Critics of this view[38]
have argued (1) that possibilities for substitution in
the process of production or in the composition of
end-products consumed are plentiful enough to
provide alternatives to the import of any particular
raw material, and/or (2) that imperialism is not
necessary to assure access to needed imports
because the exporters of key raw materials have
nothing to gain (and much to lose) by denying their
products to the huge American market. These
arguments may hold in some long-run sense, and
they may well support the proposition that the
American economy is not critically dependent upon
imperialism for its ultimate survival. But they
do not rule out the possibility that imperialist
activity may have been intended to contribute to
macroeconomic prosperity within a shorter time
horizon by preventing critical raw material
shortages from arising. For in the short-run it is
very difficult to change production processes or
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consumption patterns, and in the short run it is
quite possible that a raw material exporting
country (or several such countries acting together)
might withhold their exports from the United
States for economic or political reasons. In
conclusion, it appears that the only plausible
argument that some American imperialist activity
has been motivated by an interest in maintaining
macroeconomic prosperity is one which is based on
the importance of ensuring regular and dependable
access to foreign sources of key raw materials.
Quite apart from any incentive for imperialism
based on considerations of macroeconomic pros-
perity, there can be little doubt that an interest in
aggregate economic gains has played some role in
motivating American imperialism. Whether or not
the preservation or the expansion of foreign
investment opportunities, export markets and
import sources have been essential to maintain
macroeconomic prosperity, they have certainly
made possible some net economic gains for the
American economy. American domination of many
poor countries in the world has increased the share
of the gains from trade and investment accruing to
Americans rather than to citizens of the dominated
countries or to citizens of rival industrialized
capitalist countries. It would be quite implausible
to suggest that the U.S. government would refrain
from taking advantage of potential aggregate eco-
nomic gains made possible by imperialist activity.
Turning now to national interests in impe-
rialism based on psychic gains, one must consider
the plausibility of the missionary spirit and the urge
to dominate as contributing elements in motivating
American imperialism. It cannot be denied that
since American independence the notion that the
United States is a uniquely great nation (&dquo;God’s
own country&dquo;) and the notion that the American
way of life represents a supreme human
achievement have been systematically fostered and
have gained wide currency among the American
people. One can be as cynical as one wishes about
the sources and purposes of this chauvinist
ideology, but one cannot deny that it exists. It
follows that it is quite plausible to attribute popular
support for many imperialist ventures to a belief
that American domination of other peoples and
countries may in fact be good for them. Certainly
the United States government has often cast its
imperialist activities in the light of a modern &dquo;white
man’s burden&dquo;, and this has made imperialism
more palatable for those involved in carrying it out.
Without yet inquiring into the roots of the
missionary spirit itself, one can plausibley attribute
to it a role in encouraging American imperialism.
Like the missionary spirit, the urge to
dominate would seem to be applicable to a
significant extent to contemporary American
society. It is trite but no less true to point out that
most Americans are steeped in a competitive ethic
that places a tremendous premium on winning.
That there are always winners and loser, that some
must be dominant and others subordinate - these
are propositions that generally go unquestioned. It
follows that there is a great urge to dominate, if
only to avoid being dominated. And this individual
urge is easily translated into a national urge to
dominate other nations, whether or not there is a
seious danger of being dominated. Again, without
inquiring into the origins of the urge to dominate, it
seems quite plausible to ascribe to it a role in
motivating American imperialism.
Class interests in imperialist activity are
almost invariably cloaked in an ideological cover
that emphasizes alleged national interests. Postwar
American imperialism has most often been
justified by appeals to national security and/or to
the missionary spirit. For example, many impe-
rialist activities have been associated with an
anti-communist ideology that stresses both the
threat to American national security allegedly
posed by communist powers and the benefits
accruing to non-communist nations as a result of
United States efforts to &dquo;protect&dquo; them from
communism. Other imperialist activities have been
represented as important to protect American
national economic interests in a competitive world
economy. Sometimes a national interest is actually
involved, but often the rhetoric of national interest
merely serves to obscure situations in which only a
class interest is really at stake.
One can quite plausibly ascribe to the
dominant classes in the postwar United States a
class interest in imperialism based on the desire to
promote their own social legitimacy. By encourag-
ing imperialist activity against actual or potential
socialist societies in various parts of the world, the
dominant classes in American society could hope to
restrain the territorial spread or the success of
institutions and values that might ultimately
undermine the legitimacy - and hence threaten
the viability - of the American capitalist system
in which they dominate. Indeed, it is plausible to
suggest that the ideology of anti-communism so
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prevalent in the United States and so often used to
justify American imperialism has been promoted
by the same interest of the dominant American
classes in preserving American capitalism against
competing alternatives identified with socialism or
communism.
The interest in organizational expansion of the
civilian and especially the military bureaucracies
involved in American imperialist activity has surely
also been a force favoring postwar American
imperialism. No student of contemporary history
can fail to note the enthusiasm of the Pentagon for
military interventions and military bases around
the world. A similar enthusiasm for intervention
into the affairs of foreign societies can be found in
the ranks of American political, economic and
cultural agencies abroad. All such civilian and
military agencies thrive on foreign involvement,
which can both lead to and result from the
domination of foreigners.
Probably the most significant class interest in
imperialism in the postwar United States has been
based on the opportunity for particular economic
gains by private enterprises. There can be no doubt
that in the postwar period many - if not all -
American firms have had an economic interest in
some kind of imperialist activity. First of all, those
firms that have invested abroad, that export to
foreign markets, or that import from foreign
sources, have stood to gain by having the power of
the American government exercised on their behalf
in shaping the terms and conditions of foreign
economic relations. Secondly, private firms without
any past involvement in foreign economic relations
may nevertheless have looked forward to future
opportunities made possible by imperialist actions
that help to preserve or to extend the areas open to
American private enterprise. Finally, even those
firms that never trade or invest abroad have stood
to gain to the extent that imperialism promotes an
increasing internationalization of the division of
labor, for this places relatively scarce American
labor in increasing competition with relatively
abundant foreign labor.[39] For all of these reasons
it is no exaggeration to suggest that there exists a
substantial class interest in imperialism on the part
of the American capitalist class.
It remains now to consider whether the
distribution of power in the United States has been
such as to permit the interests in imperialism
identified above to be translated into imperialist
government policy. To answer this question one
must first seek to identify those groups within
American society who have something to lose by
imperialist activity and might therefore possibly
oppose it. First of all, there are all the taxpaying
citizens and firms who ultimately bear the financial
burden of imperialism. In the case of military
action there are the soldiers who suffer injury or
death. There may also be particular groups whose
interests are adversely affected by the results of an
imperialist activity: for example, the consumers of
oil who pay higher prices when the monopolistic
position of the oil companies is protected; or the
workers who lose their jobs because a firm shifts its
operations to a more profitable foreign location; or
the businesses which find themselves at a
competitive disadvantage because a rival firm
secured a privileged position abroad.
In the case of a national interest in
imperialism the losses to such groups are by
definition outweighed by the aggregate gains to
whole population. There may even be offsetting
gains to groups that have something to lose. Only if
a group that suffers net losses has also a vastly
disproportionate power to influence government
decisions on imperialism can it be expected to pre-
vent imperialist activity that is in the national inter-
est. A glance at the categories of possible losers
listed above reveals little political strength. The
financial costs of imperialism are diffused widely
among the taxpaying public and may be offset by
diffused aggregate gains. Soldiers are dispropor-
tionately drawn from the poorest and politically
weakest strata of society. Consumers, workers and
businesses who lose from a particular imperialist
activity tend to be isolated and organizationally
weak. In sum, there is every reason to believe that
in the postwar United States, a national interest in
imperialism is sufficient to motivate government
policy without serious opposition.
To demonstrate that a class interest in
imperialism is sufficient to motivate government
policy, even in the absence of a national interest,
one must make a stronger case. It must be shown
not only that the potentially anti-imperialist
opposition tends to be weak, but also that the
pro-imperialist class is disproportionately strong.
There are several factors that work to favor the
beneficiaries of imperialist activity over the losers
in the determination of American foreign policy.
First, although the beneficiaries may be much
fewer in number, they typically command much
greater wealth and power than the losers and
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therefore have a vastly disproportionate influence
on decision-making even in the most democratic of
political frameworks. [40] The dominant classes
with an interest in promoting their own social
legitimacy have by definition a dominant position
and correspondingly disproportionate power to
shape foreign policy. The civilian and military
bureaucracies interested in organizational expan-
sion can count on the potent political force
represented by the Pentagon and its allies in the
military-industrial complex in contemporary Ame-
rican society. And the capitalist class with its
interest in particular economic gains is obviously
much stronger economically and politically than
the rest of American society. Moreover, within the
capitalist class, the firms most directly involved in
foreign economic operations include many of the
most powerful corporations in the United States. In
1965, nine of the largest ten and at least 18 of the
largest 25 corporations (ranked by sales) were
significantly involved in foreign operations.[41]
These 18 corporations alone accounted for almost
20% of the total sales and almost 30% of the
after-tax profits of all American industrial
corporations.[42] Hence even when there are
conflicts of interest within the capitalist class over
particular imperialist activities, the balance of
power often tilts in favor of the pro-imperialists.
A second factor that enhances the effective
power of the beneficiaries of imperialism is that the
gains from an imperialist action tend to be large for
the immediate beneficiaries while the losses tend to
be spread widely and therefore thinly over the
much larger number of losers. Under such
circumstances, the gainers are always better
motivated and better situated to mobilize
themselves as an effective political force. It is not
necessary that the beneficiaries of imperialism
dominate all policy-making in order that the
government be induced to undertake imperialist
activities that serve particular class interests; it is
only necessary that the beneficiaries exercise
disproportionate influence in the sphere of foreign
policy, which they can more easily do if the losers
have less at stake and hence less interest in foreign
policy decisions than the beneficiaries.[43]
Finally, the gainers from imperialism can
often generate support - or at least consent -
from among the objective losers by playing upon
compelling ideological themes that suggest a
national rather than a class interest. It has already
been suggested that the presumed national interest
in national security and the apparent national
missionary spirit in the United States may in fact
be traceable in considerable degree to class
interests in imperialism, even though such national
interests may come to exert an independent
influence on foreign policy.
In sum, the balance of power seems likely to
tilt in favor of imperialism in contemporary
American society unless the costs of a given activity
become so high as to weigh heavily and obviously
on large segments of the population, or unless the
activity involves a sharp conflict of interest among
powerful classes themselves. Such situations do
arise from time to time (e.g., the war in Vietnam),
and they set limits on the extent to which - or the
manner in which - the United States government
is motivated to pursue imperialist policies. But it is
clear that long before such a point is reached there
is a great deal of scope for American imperialism
based on class interests without any national
interest necessarily at stake.
One final point deserves mention here. The
analysis in this essay has been developed in a
framework of assumed rationality. Motivations for
American imperialism have been attributed to the
interest and power of various classes within
American society, under the assumption that
people and groups generally perceive their interests
and act upon them insofar as their power permits.
It is of course quite conceivable that some
American imperialist activity has resulted either
from gross misperceptions of reality, or from
highly irrational drives. That such possibilities have
been excluded from the analysis reflects a belief not
that they do not exist, but simply that they are not
of great importance. To attribute a major role to
misperceptions and irrationality in explaining
American foreign policy is to subscribe to a
fundamental cynicism about human behavior that
would make social studies difficult and meaningful
action virtually impossible.
IV. Capitalism and American Imperialism
Like &dquo;imperialism&dquo;, &dquo;capitalism&dquo; is a word
that means many different things to many different
people; hence it is important to define clearly what
intended by the term. I will attempt to define
capitalism so as to reflect the general usage of
radical writers whose views on the relationship
between imperialism and capitalism are at issue in
this essay.
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Capitalism is a form of socioeconomic
organization (or a &dquo;mode of production&dquo;, to use the
Marxist term) which is characterized by all of the
following conditions.[44] (1) Private ownership of
the means of production: a significant share of the
productive wealth of the society is owned by private
individuals pursuing private profits. (2) Proleta-
rianization of the work force: a large proportion of
the population has virtually no claim to ownership
of the means of production and is obliged to sell its
labor services in the labor market in order to
receive any income. Conversely, a small proportion
of the population owns most of the means of
production. (3) Hierarchical control of the
production process: economic activity is carried out
by units of enterprise in which decision-making
control is vested in (at most) a few top owners and
managers while the great majority of workers have
no such control. (4) Individual material gain
incentives: labor is allocated and work is motivated
by a system of differential economic rewards in the
form of money wages and profits received by
individual workers and owners of the means of
production.
There can be no doubt that the form of
socioeconomic organization prevailing in the
contemporary United States as well as in Canada,
most of Western Europe, Japan, Australia and New
Zealand, conforms to each aspect of the above
definition of capitalism. Not so obvious, perhaps, is
the fact that there is nothing inevitable or universal
about the capitalist form of socioeconomic organi-
zation. Not only have earlier historical eras
displayed examples of societies that are charac-
terized by few or none of the conditions associated
with capitalism, but contemporary &dquo;socialist&dquo;
societies show evidence of varying degrees of
departure from the four basic features of a
capitalist society listed above.[45]
Certain consequences of the capitalist form of
socioeconomic organization deserve emphasis here.
The viability of any social system requires that
there be a prevailing set of institutionalized values
which encourage patterns of behavior consistent
with the smooth functioning of the system.[46]
These values are an essential complement to the
basic socioeconomic institutions that define the
system. In the case of capitalism, the successful
operation of individual material gain incentives
requires that people behave as &dquo;homo econo-
micus&dquo;, the economically rational man.[47] Homo
economicus strives for individual gain; he seeks to
maximize his money income in order to satisfy his
wants; he is concerned about the extrinsic rewards
for his productive activity rather than the intrinsic
quality of the activity itself. Such behavior must be
sustained by a set of values that emphasize the
importance of the individual rather than the larger
community, that urge competition rather than
cooperation, and that stress the primacy of
material goods and services (purchusable with
money income) for satisfying human needs and
promoting human welfare. These capitalist values
place a tremendous premium on increasing the
supply of marketable goods and services available
to the society, while other conceivable social goals
- e.g. greater equity, greater economic self-suffi-
ciency at a local or national level, development of
more meaningful and less fragmented communi-
ties, improvement of the quality of the work
experience - are viewed as subordinate to the
primary goal of economic growth.
A second imprtant consequence of capitalism
concerns the process and the outcome of income
distribution.[48] Private ownership of the means of
production and reliance on individual material
gain incentives imply that in a capitalist society
income distribution is linked directly to the
process of production. Property income and labor
income are distributed to the owners of the
property and the sellers of labor essentially
according to the market-valued contribution of
their property and their labor to the output of
goods and services. Income distribution is therefore
not a matter for political determination by the
society as a whole; instead, it emerges largely from
the process whereby the market mechanism
allocates resources to production. This process of
income distribution is bound to create great
inequalities of income. Not only does the small
proportion of the population that owns most of the
means of production receive the lion’s share of
property income, but also labor income is very
unequally distributed because of the need to
allocate and motivate work through differential
economic rewards. Hence, a capitalist society is
inherently an economically unequal society.
A final important consequence of the
capitalist form of socio economic organization
stems from its inherent economic inequality and
from the inherent social inequality that results
from hierarchical control of the production
process. Economic and social inequality (which are
bound to be highly correlated) imply political
53
inequality. A society that is predicated upon
significant economic and social differentials is a
society in which there cannot be a genuine
democracy, in the sense of equal participation in
political decision-making by those affected by the
decision. So long as some people have much greater
access to economic resources than others, they can
have much greater influence on political decision-
making ; and so long as the structure of decision-
making at the workplace is highly authoritarian,
one cannot expect the structure of decision-making
at the community or national level to be ega-
litarian.[49] Thus capitalism is fundamentally
incompatible with democracy.[50]
The question to be considered now is whether
the sources of American imperialism identified in
section III are related in any significant manner to
the capitalist institutions that characterize the
contemporary United States, or - alternately -
whether they have little to do with the specifically
capitalistic character of American socioeconomic
organization. In the following paragraphs, I will
examine each plausible source of American
imperialism to evaluate its relationship to
capitalism.
The first motivation for imperialism that
appeared applicable to the contemporary United
States was based on a national interest in national
security. To the extent that this interest is not
merely an ideological cover for other interests, it is
one which arises as a result of potential external
threats to the nation. The existence and strength of
such threats depends upon the disposition of
foreign powers towards the United States.
Whatever the character of American internal
socioeconomic organization, there is always a
possibility that foreign powers will prove hostile. So
long as the world is divided into nation-states
without an accepted and respected superior
authority to maintain world peace, each individual
nation-state will have some justifiable concern
about its national security. Hence the national
security motivation for imperialism is one which
would not seem to be attributable in any significant
sense to capitalism, or to any other specific form of
socioeconomic organization.
Among various motivations for imperialism
arising from a national interest in macroeconomic
prosperity, the only one that appeared plausible in
the context of the contemporary United States was
based on a need to secure access to foreign sources
of key raw materials. At first glance such a need
does not seem to be peculiar to capitalism. If the
American economy is critically dependent upon key
raw materials, it is hard to see why this dependence
should be any less significant under some form of
socioeconomic organization other than capitalism.
Yet closer examination of the question suggests a
line of reasoning which might well link raw-
material oriented imperialism in some degree to
capitalism.
The demand for raw materials in an economy
depends upon both the aggregate level and the
sectoral composition of output. The higher the level
of output, and the more heavily the sectoral
composition of output is weighted toward
industries requiring imported raw materials, the
greater will be the demand for such imports. Given
the emphasis placed on economic growth in a
capitalist society, one can argue that capitalism is
likely to generate a more rapid rate of growth of
output and correspondingly higher levels of
demand for imported raw materials than might an
alternative form of socioeconomic organization.
Moreover, the very unequal distribution of income
associated with capitalism may lead to a sectoral
composition of output that is oriented more heavily
towards products requiring imported raw material
inputs than would be the case under conditions of
greater equality. For the kind of products whose
production is most dependent upon the import of
key raw materials tend to be industrial and
technologically sophisticated (e.g. jet engines), and
such products cater disproportionately to the
demand of rich consumers. The demand of the
poor and middle-income classes is more heavily
concentrated on agricultural and simpler industrial
products whose production is less dependent on
scarce raw materials. Assuming that the composi-
tion of output reflects to some extent the structure
of demand[51], inequality in the distribution of
income will be associated with greater dependence
on key raw material imports.
Obviously a non-capitalist society could also
generate a motivation for imperialist activity
designed to secure access to foreign sources of raw
materials. But there are nonetheless grounds for
believing that under otherwise similar circum-
stances such a motivation would be especially
strong under capitalism because of its emphasis on
economic growth and its inherent economic
inequality.
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A national interest in aggregate economic
gains - like a national interest in macroeconomic
prosperity - could serve to motivate imperialist
activity both in capitalist and in non-capitalist
societies. But again there is good reason to believe
that such a motivation would be particularly
forceful under capitalism. First of all, the emphasis
placed on the desirability of increasing the
available supply of goods and services in a
capitalist society puts a great premium on the
ability of a government to promote economic
growth. In a society where there is such pressure to
&dquo;deliver the goods&dquo;, the government will be more
highly motivated to seek out and exploit
opportunities for economic gain through imperi-
alism than it would in a society where other social
goals were relatively more important.
One alternative social goal that is notably de-
emphasized under capitalism is economic self-
sufficiency. Capitalism encourages a relatively
high degree of economic specialization in order to
reap the economic gains made possible by a wide
division of labor. Hence capitalism discourages
efforts to promote self-sufficiency at a local or
national level, for this requires deliberate
diversification rather than specialization of eco-
nomic activities. But the greater the emphasis
placed upon specialization, the more extensively a
society will undertake international trade and
investment whose purpose is precisely to reap the
economic efficiency gains from extending the
division of labor from a national to an international
level. Hence a capitalist society is likely to be more
heavily involved in international economic relations
than an alternative society with greater orientation
to self-sufficiency and a capitalist government
would have correspondingly greater opportunities
as well as a greater incentive to secure economic
gains from imperialism.
The existence of a national missionary spirit
that motivates imperialism requires that two
conditions be satisfied. On the one hand, there
must be a strong belief by the people of a society
that their own way of life is a superior one. On the
other hand, there must be a belief in the
acceptability of imposing a way of life on others
through the use of dominant power. The first of
these conditions cannot be identified more strongly
with one form of socioeconomic organization than
another. For good or bad reasons, people in both
capitalist and non-capitalist societies may well
come to believe in the superiority of their own
system. But whether people will find acceptable the
use of power to spread a system depends upon the
extent to which concern about outcomes overrides
concern about the processes whereby outcomes are
achieved. The more highly the values of a society
stress genuine democracy - participation in
decision-making by those affected by the decisions
- the less acceptable will be the imposition of a
system on others no matter how &dquo;good&dquo; for them it
may appear to be. Hence the more truly democratic
the form of socioeconomic organization, the less
will be the motivation for imperialism based upon a
missionary spirit. And because capitalism pre-
cludes true democracy, a capitalist society will be
more susceptible to undertake missionary imperi-
alism than an alternative society more compatible
with democracy.
The urge to dominate as a source of
imperialism is often described as an innate human
drive, an element of human nature impervious to
the social environment. Yet it seems quite unrea-
sonable to insist that the form of socioeconomic
organization and the values that complement it
have no influence on the attitude of people toward
one another. Instead, one would expect rather
different attitudes to emerge from (1) a society
which stresses the importance of the individual and
competition among individuals and (2) a society
which stresses the importance of the community
and cooperation among its members. The more
competitive a society, the more an individual is
likely to be motivated to dominate others, and the
more the society as a whole may be motivated to
dominate other societies. Without question capital-
ism is a highly competitive form of social
organization, and the urge to dominate is therefore
more likely to motivate imperialism in a capitalist
society than in many other less competitive social
systems.
For a class interest alone to motivate imperial-
ism, there must be a class with both the interest
and the power to influence the government to
undertake an activity that is not in any national
interest. In studying the relationship between
capitalism and class-based imperialism, one must
therefore examine both the nature of class interests
and the distribution of class power. Turning first to
the question of power, it is clear that there can be
no class-based motivation for imperialism in a
genuine democracy. For if everyone in a society
participated equally in the political process, the
government could not undertake imperialist
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activities whose anticipated costs to the society as a
whole were greater than the anticipated benefits to
a particular class. Since capitalism is incompatible
with true democracy, a capitalist society offers a
potential for class-based imperialism of various
kinds which would not be possible in an alternative
democractic society. If only for this reason, the fact
that a particular society is capitalist does affect the
likelihood of imperialist activity.
It can also be argued, however, that capitalism
generates certain class interests in imperialism that
would either be absent or be less forceful under
other possible forms of socioeconomic organiza-
tion. This appears to be true of at least two of the
three types of class interest that were cited in
Section III as applicable to the contemporary
United States.
A class interest in promoting social legitimacy
through imperialism becomes significant whenever
dominant classes in a society have reason to be
concerned about the acceptance of their dominance
by the rest of the people. As a very unequal form of
socioeconomic organization, capitalism obviously
generates some dominant classes, and these classes
have a potentially greater concern about their
social legitimacy than would (less) dominant classes
in a more equal society. But while its basic
economic institutions imply profound inequalities,
the value system associated with capitalism - with
its emphasis on the right (and obligation) of
individuals to compete with one another in striving
for personal advancement - suggests an ideal of
free and fair competition. As people within a
capitalist society come to recognize how unfree and
unfair the competition often is (because of the
inequality inherent in the underlying institutions),
they are unlikely to accept the domination of the
dominant classes. Thus under capitalism a contra-
diction between the socioeconomic base and certain
aspects of the ideological superstructure will
increase the interest of dominant classes in
providing some kind of legitimacy for their
dominance. For the reasons suggested in Section II,
imperialism can help to serve this purpose.
A class interest in promoting organizational
expansion through imperialism would not appear
to be more or less likely under capitalism than
under any other form of socioeconomic organiza-
tion. One might possibly argue that because the
capitalist system of private enterprise limits the role
of government bureaucracy in domestic affairs,
civilian and military agencies would be all the more
enthusiastic about satisfying their growth impera-
tive abroad. But it has become clear that modern
capitalism calls for a substantial government role
in many domestic economic and social spheres, so
that the potential for organizational expansion is
not significantly limited to foreign affairs.
Of the three types of class interest in imperial-
ism discussed in this paper, it is the class interest in
particular economic gains that is most clearly
linked to capitalism as a form of socioeconomic
organization. This is not only because of the
importance attached to strictly economic objectives
in a capitalist society. Nor is it due simply to the
fact that under capitalism most of the means of
production are privately rather than publicly
owned. There is a more fundamental reason why in
a capitalist society particular groups should seek to
promote imperialism as a means for realizing
particular economic gains. This reason has to do
with the manner in which income is distributed
under capitalism.
To see this one must recognize that an
imperialist activity motivated by a class interest in
economic gain involves in effect an anticipated
redistribution of economic benefits from the rest of
the population to the particular interested class.
This redistribution does not involve any direct
transfer, but it results indirectly from (1) taxing (or
otherwise burdening) the society as a whole for the
cost of the activity and (2) benefitting the particular
class by bringing about changes in the internation-
al economic situation which increase its income-
earning opportunities.
It is precisely the indirect character of the
distribution that makes it attractive to particular
classes in a capitalist society. For under capitalism
income is supposed to be distributed to individuals
in accordance with their market-valued contribu-
tion to production. The only legitimate source of
income is the production process itself, as mediated
by the market mechanism. Direct transfers of
income without any quid pro quo are limited to
somewhat exceptional circumstances. This means
not only that the poor cannot expect substantial
relief from poverty through transfers of income
from the rich, but also that the rich cannot expect
to get the government to transfer income directly
from others to themselves - no matter how
powerful they may be. Hence any significant
redistribution in favor of the rich and powerful can
be brought about only indirectly by government
activity which affects the process by which the
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market distributes income.
In a society where income were distributed
according to explicitly political criteria rather than
according to an apparently apolitical economic
mechanism, it would make no difference whether
redistribution of income were brought about
directly or indirectly. The outcome of the income
distribution process would be the object of concern
rather than the process itself. In such a situation a
powerful group would find it no easier to get
income redistributed to itself indirectly than
directly. Moreover, it would not seek to get income
redistributed by an activity that might reduce the
size of the aggregate economic pie. But under
capitalism redistribution in favor of powerful
groups can be brought about only indirectly. Hence
in any government activity which indirectly redis-
tributes income in favor of particular classes, even
if the activity involves aggregate economic losses.
There are a variety of ways in which a government
can indirectly redistribute income, through domes-
tic as well as foreign programs. But imperialist
activity clearly offers many such opportunities, and
a class interest in achieving particular economic
gains through imperialism is therefore significantly
linked to the capitalist form of socioeconomic
organization.
V. Conclusion
The analysis in Section IV leaves no doubt that
postwar American imperialism can be traced in
significant respects to the capitalist character of
American society. Most of the plausible sources of
American imperialism owe their existence and/or
their strength to characteristics of a capitalist
society which need not necessarily characterize al-
ternative forms of socioeconomic organization. The
only relevant source of imperialism that appears to
be quite unrelated to the internal socioeconomic
organization of the United States is the one based
upon a national interest in national security. Not
surprisingly, this is the source that is given the
greatest (if not the sole) attention by orthodox
theorists. But every other relevant source of
American imperialism based upon a national
interest, as well as every source based upon a class
interest,[52] is conditioned by certain aspects of the
(capitalist) internal socioeconomic organizaton of
the United States. The radical view that American
imperialism cannot be adequately explained
without reference to American capitalism is
therefore fully confirmed.
There are three specific characteristics of a
capitalist society which appear to be most
significant in enhancing its propensity for
imperialism. The first is the emphasis on individual
economic gain as a primary objective of human
activity, which derives from the institutional values
of a capitalist system. The second is the linking of
income distribution directly to the process of
production, which is based upon the operation of
the capitalist market mechanism. And the third is
the unequal and therefore inherently undemocratic
nature of the society, which results from the basic
economic institutions of capitalism. The capitalist
emphasis on economic gain intensifies national
interests in imperialism to promote macroeconomic
prosperity, to achieve aggregate economic gains,
and to satisfy an urge to dominate; and it
intensifies class interests in particular economic
gains. The capitalist process of income distribution
intensifies class interests in particular economic
gains and contributes to the unequal and
undemocratic nature of capitalist society. This
inequality and lack of effective democracy in turn
intensifies national interests in imperialism to
promote economic prosperity and to exercise a
missionary spirit; it intensifies a class interest in
social legitimacy and makes possible the transla-
tion of each major type of class interest in
imperialism into an actual motivation for imperial-
ist activity.
While these relations serve to link imperialism
to capitalism in a causally significant manner,
there are certain conclusions that do not follow
from the analysis. It cannot be argued that
capitalism is the only form of socioeconomic
organization that leads to imperialism, nor even
that capitalism is more likely than any other form
of socioeconomic organization to lead to imperial-
ism. For some of the sources of imperialism
discussed here are at least in some degree indepen-
dent of capitalism, and other possible sources of
imperialism that are independent of capitalism
may be relevant in a different context than that of
the contemporary United States. What does follow
from the analysis of this paper is that capitalism
leads to substantially more imperialist activity than
would result from at least some alternative forms of
internal socioeconomic organization under similar
external circumstances.
The analysis also lends no support to the
proposition that a capitalist society requires
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imperialism in order to survive. This proposition
may be asserted by some radicals, but it is more
often attributed to radicals by orthodox theorists
who find it convenient to present radical views in
simplistic and therefore vulnerable form. It is
virtually impossible to prove that imperialism is
necessary for the survival of a capitalist society, for
there are many means by which a capitalist society
could conceivably remain viable. Yet the fact that a
capitalist society may in theory be able to survive
without imperialism in no way diminishes the
extent to which capitalist institutions can and do in
practice stimulate imperialist activity. As one
radical theorist of imperialism has observed, the
(capitalist) United States does not require imperial-
ism any more than it requires Texas and New
Mexico; but one might as confidently expect the
(capitalist) United States to abandon its imperialist
activity as to return Texas and New Mexico to the
Mexicans.[53]
The analysis of the relationship between
capitalism and imperialism in this paper does
suggest certain directions for anti-imperialist
movements in capitalist countries such as the
United States. By identifying the specific character-
istics of capitalism which contribute most
significantly to imperialism, one can gain some
understanding of the kinds of reforms that might
help to limit the extent of imperialist activity under
capitalism and the kinds of radical changes in basic
institutions that would be necessary to develop an
alternative and much less imperialist society.
Within the context of a capitalist society, the
motivations for the government to undertake
imperialist activity may be lessened to the extent (1)
that the primacy of economic gain as a social
objective can be diminished; (2) that the distribu-
tion of income can be made a more explicitly
political issue; and (3) that income inequality can
be reduced and democracy can be made more
effective. Progress in these directions depends
largely upon the ability of the disenchanted groups
and the dominated classes in capitalist society to
organize themselves and develop a stronger
political force with which to oppose the power of
the dominant classes who have the most to gain
from the status quo. There is some hopeful
evidence that the war in Indochina has served to
galvanize more effective opposition to American
imperialism in particular and the oppressive
aspects of American capitalism in general.
But one must recognize that the very nature of
capitalist society places significant limits on the
extent to which political reform movements can
expect to curtail imperialism under capitalism. So
long as the basic institutions of American society
remain capitalist, economic gain will remain an
important goal, inequality will persist and genuine
democracy will be unattainable. The kinds of insti-
tutional changes necessary to make substantial
progress in eliminating the imperialist urges of a
capitalist society would involve the development of
a radically different form of socioeconomic
organization in which (1) economic activity would
be motivated by an incentive system that did not
rely primarily on the prospect of individual
economic gain in competition with other indivi-
duals ; (2) income and wealth would be shared in an
egalitarian manner; (3) control over the process of
production would be exercised by all those
involved, and the distinction between owner and
worker would disappear. An egalitarian society in
which economic activity was based upon collective
rather than individual incentives and cooperative
rather than competitive behavior would encourage
a set of institutionalized values in which social
goals other than economic gain were paramount
and would facilitate the functioning of a truly
effective democracy. Utopian as such a system may
appear to contemporary observers, it represents the
kind of long-run goal toward which an anti-imper-
ialist movement must be directed if it is to achieve
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NOTES
1. See, for example, the historical accounts of American
imperialism in Zevin (1972), pp. 321-333; in Magdoff
(1970a); and in Williams (1962).
2. It would be impossible to list the names of all radical
writers on the subject of American imperialism. For a re-
presentative sample of recent radical work, see Magdoff
(1969), Kolko (1969), MacEwan (1972), and many of the
essays reprinted in Fann and Hodges (1971).
3. Orthodox critics of the radical theorists include
Miller, Bennett and Alapatt (1970), Tucker (1971), and
Cohen (1973).
4. See, for example, Kindleberger (1970), chapter 5.
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5. This is how the issue is posed by Miller, Bennett and
Alapatt (1970).
6. I am indebted to Noam Chomsky for help in
clarifying the distinctive characteristics of a radical
approach.
7. Thus Cohen (1973), p. 245, states that "the real tap-
root of imperialism" is "the anarchic organization of the
international system of states ... The logic of dominion
derives directly from the existence of competing national
sovereignties"; and Tucker (1971), p. 73, asks: "Why may
we not say simply that the interests of states expand
roughly with their power and that America has been no
exception to this experience?"
8. Not all radical theorists of imperialism would de-
scribe themselves as Marxists, but they do share the
Marxist methodological emphasis on analyzing the inter-
nal socioeconomic structure of a society in order to under-
stand its behavior.
9. The distinction that I am making here between radi-
cal and orthodox theories can be related to the exhaustive
classification of explanations of the causes of war sug-
gested by Waltz (1959). Waltz divides explanations of war
into three categories according to whether they are (1)
based on human nature; (2) based on the internal struc-
ture of particular states; or (3) based on the (external)
structure of a system of separate states. Orthodox
theories stress the third category of explanation and tend
to ignore the second; radical theories emphasize the
importance of the second category.
10. For useful discussions of the problems involved in
defining imperialism, see Zevin (1972), pp. 316-321, and
Cohen (1973), chapter 1.
11. Lenin (1917) has provided the best-known Marxist
definition of imperialism as "the monopoly stage of capi-
talism" characterized by "(1) the concentration of produc-
tion and capital ... (2) the merging of bank capital with
industrial capital ... (3) the export of capital ... (4) the
formation of international capitalist monopolies... (5) the
territorial division of the whole world ...". The quota-
tions are from pp. 88-89 of the 1939 edition of Lenin
(1917).
12. A typical example of a non-Marxist definition of
imperialism is the one proposed by Cohen (1973, p. 16):
"any relationship of effective domination or control,
political or economic, direct or indirect, of one nation over
another."
13. By focusing attention on government activity, I am
ignoring the variety of means by which private firms or
organizations use their own power directly to affect
conditions abroad. But I do take account of the way in
which they do this indirectly through their influence on
government; see the discussion of motivations for
imperialism based on class interests in particular
economic gains in sections II, III and IV of the paper.
14. My definition of imperialism is not equivalent
simply to intervention abroad, for it excludes instances of
economic or military aid to foreign friends and allies
which do not entail any relationship of domination and
control.
15. Landes (1961), p. 510.
16. See, for example, Tucker (1971), esp. pp. 55-82, and
Cohen (1973), chapter 7.
17. The desire to maintain macroeconomic prosperity is
often presented by radical theorists in the context of a
capitalist society as a class-based rather than a nationa’
motivation for imperialism. The reasoning is that only the
dominant classes have a real interest in maintaining
prosperity because it is primarily they who benefit from
the existing economic system, while most of the people
would be better off under another system which might
replace a crisis-stricken capitalism. But this long-run
outcome is problematic: in the short run everyone stands
to lose if the economy is in crisis. Thus there is at least a
short-run national interest &mdash; and possibly also a long-run
national interest &mdash; in maintaining economic prosperity.
This kind of national interest is quite distinct from the
kind of class interests discussed later in which the short-
run and the long-run benefits accrue only to particular
classes.
18. See Hobson (1902), Luxemburg (1913), and Lenin
(1917). Although some writers &mdash; e.g. Alavi (1964) &mdash;
associate Lenin with an underconsumption/surplus-capi-
tal theory of imperialism, drawing mainly on Lenin
(1917), chapter 4, Harry Magdoff has stressed to me that
this is a misrepresentation of Lenin’s overall approach to
imperialism.
Baran and Sweezy (1966), chapter 7, and Reich and
Finkelhor (1970) have developed the argument that
military expenditures are an important source of surplus
absorption in the American capitalist economy. Although
these authors do not suggest that imperialism is
necessary in order to sustain such expenditures, Baran
and Sweezy do stress the strong compatibility of militar-
ism and imperialism.
20. The work of Magdoff (1966) is probably the best
known; other radical theoriests arguing along related
lines include Kolko (1969), Julien (1971), O’Connor (1971)
and Dean (1971).
21. See Hilferding (1910), Luxemburg (1913) and Lenin
(1917).
22. The notion of a missionary spirit as one among
several sources of imperialism is implicit in the work of
Williams (1962), and it is suggested explicitly by Zevin
(1972), pp. 357-360.
23. The view that imperialism results from an atavistic
human urge to dominate is most prominently associated
with Schumpeter (1919), but it is also implied by Landes
(1961).
24. Social legitimacy as a class-based source of Ameri-
can imperialism is stressed by MacEwan (1972), esp. pp.
49-51.
25. Emphasis on the military bureaucracy as a source of
American imperialism is common among contemporary
"liberals"; see, for example, Bosch (1968) and Melman
(1970).
26. The notion that a national security interest is the
primary tap-root of imperialism is advanced by Cohen
(1973), chapter 7.
27. See Miller, Bennett and Alapatt (1970); Tucker
(1971), pp. 117-138; and Cohen (1973), chapter 4.
28. This can be verified by a glance at the annual
figures of U.S. net exports and gross national product
displayed in Table C-1 of the 1973 Economic Report of the
President.
29. Annual figures for U.S. "national defense" expendi-
ture as well as gross national product are given in Table
C-1 of the 1973 Economic REport of the President.
30. This correlation is documented in the Appendix to
Weisskopf (1972b).
31. These figures are drawn from articles on the inter-
national investment position of the United States
published annually in one of the monthly issues of the
Department of Commerce’s Survey of Current Business.
32. These percentages are drawn from Weisskopf
(1972c), table 10-B; the figure for 1971 is based on an
extrapolation of the trend through 1969.
33. See footnote 32.
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34. For documentation see Weisskopf (1972c), Table
10-D.
35. Among the "developed" capitalist countries only
Japan places strict limitations on foreign investment in
the domestic economy.
36. Figures on the value of U.S. exports to "developed"
and "developing" countries, respectively, are given in
Table C-89 of the 1973 Economic Report of the President.
37. See Magdoff (1969), esp. pp. 45-54; Kolko (1969),
Chapter 3; Julien (1971); Dean (1971) and Brown (1972).
38. See Miller, Bennett and Alapatt (1970), pp. 16-17;
and Tucker (1971), pp. 118-126.
39. I was reminded of this point by Sam Bowles; it
follows from the neoclassical theory of international trade
and was first emphasized in a classic article by Stolper
and Samuelson (1941).
40. Miliband (1967), chapters 6 and 7, describes many of
the means by which powerful groups are able to wield
disproportionate power in a capitalist democracy.
41. This is documented in Weisskopf (1972c), Table
10-E.
42. See footnote 41.
43. I am indebted to Sam Bowles and Noam Chomsky
for making this point.
44. For a very similar characterization of the capitalist
mode of production, see Edwards, Reich and Weisskopf
(1972), introduction to chapter 3.
45. China appears to have moved furthest from a
capitalist mode of production; Cuba to a lesser degree;
and the Soviet Union only to the extent of abolishing
private ownership of the means of production. For useful
discussions of the contemporary Chinese mode of produc-
tion, see Gurley (1971) and Riskin (1973).
46. This proposition has been elaborated in the work of
Gintis (1972), who combines elements of Marxian and
Parsonian theories of the structure of social systems.
47. See Edwards, Reich and Weisskopf (1972),
introduction to Chapter 3, as well as Gintis (1972) for
discussion of this point.
48. The process and the outcome of income distribution
in a capitalist society is analyzed in greater detail by
Weisskopf (1972a).
49. That democracy at the workplace is a prerequisite
for democracy in other spheres of life is emphasized by
Pateman (1970).
50. I am indebted to many critics of the earlier version
of my paper for stressing this point.
51. In principle foreign trade can break the link
between the composition of domestic output and the
structure of domestic demand, but in practice trade is
never carried out so extensively as to divorce the two
entirely.
52. All class-based motivations for imperialism are
conditioned by capitalism because they depend for their
force on the absence of genuine democracy, and
capitalism precludes genuine democracy.
53. This point is made by Magdoff (1970b) in response
to Miller, Bennett and Alapatt (1970).
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